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Abstract
Adversarial example generation methods in
NLP rely on models like language models or
sentence encoders to determine if potential ad-
versarial examples are valid. In these methods,
a valid adversarial example fools the model be-
ing attacked, and is determined to be semanti-
cally or syntactically valid by a second model.
Research to date has counted all such exam-
ples as errors by the attacked model. We con-
tend that these adversarial examples may not
be flaws in the attacked model, but flaws in the
model that determines validity. We term such
invalid inputs second-order adversarial exam-
ples. We propose the constraint robustness
curve, and associated metric ACCS, as tools
for evaluating the robustness of a constraint to
second-order adversarial examples. To gener-
ate this curve, we design an adversarial attack
to run directly on the semantic similarity mod-
els. We test on two constraints, the Univer-
sal Sentence Encoder (USE) and BERTScore.
Our findings indicate that such second-order
examples exist, but are typically less common
than first-order adversarial examples in state-
of-the-art models. They also indicate that USE
is effective as constraint on NLP adversarial
examples, while BERTScore is nearly ineffec-
tual. Code for running the experiments in this
paper is available here.
1 Introduction
If an imperceptible change to an input causes a
model to make a misclassification, the perturbed
input is known as an adversarial example (Good-
fellow et al., 2014). In domains with continuous
inputs like audio and vision, whether such a change
is considered “imperceptible” can be easily mea-
sured: A change to an image may be considered
imperceptible (and thus a valid adversarial exam-
ple) if the resulting image is no more than some
fixed distance away in pixel space (Chakraborty
et al., 2018).
Original
Premise: Two bearded men sit side by side.
Hypothesis: Two men are sitting down. 
  →  Model Prediction: Entailment (99.8%)
Perturbation
Premise: Two bearded men sit side by side.
Hypothesis: Two women are standing down.
  →  Model Prediction: Contradiction (99.9%)
USE Cosine Similarity:
0.93 (Valid Adversarial Example)
Figure 1: A second-order adversarial example in NLP.
Although the perturbation has different meaning than
the original (and the entailment model correctly pre-
dicts a contradiction), the sentence encoding similar-
ity does not reflect this change. Current NLP adver-
sarial example generation methods would incorrectly
consider this a flaw in the entailment model.
We refer to the function that determines imper-
ceptibility as the constraint, C. For input x and
perturbation xadv, if C(x, xadv) is true, xadv is a
valid perturbation for x.
Different domains call for different constraints.
In vision, a common constraint is `∞(x, xadv),
the maximum pixel-wise distance between image
x and its perturbation xadv (Goodfellow et al.,
2014). In audio, a common constraint is |dB(x)−
dB(xadv)|, the distortion in decibels between audio
input x and perturbation xadv (Carlini and Wagner,
2018). Both constraints are easily computed, well-
understood, and correlate with human perceptual
distance.
Choosing the correct constraint is not always so
straightforward. In discrete domains like language,
there is no obvious choice. In fact, the field lacks
consensus on even the meaning of “imperceptibil-
ity”. Different adversarial attacks have used dif-
ferent definitions of imperceptibility (Zhang et al.,
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2020a). One common definition (Alzantot et al.,
2018; Jin et al., 2019; Ren et al., 2019; Garg and
Ramakrishnan, 2020) is imperceptibility with re-
spect to meaning: C(x, xadv) is true if xadv retains
the semantics of x.
With this definition, a perturbation xadv is deter-
mined to be a valid adversarial example if it simul-
taneously fools the model and retains the semantics
of x. This formulation is problematic because mea-
suring semantic similarity is an open problem in
NLP. As a consequence, many adversarial attacks
use a second NLP model as a constraint, to deter-
mine whether or not xadv preserves the semantics
of x.
Just like the model under attack, the semantic
similarity model is vulnerable to adversarial ex-
amples. So when this type of attack finds a valid
adversarial example, it is unclear which model has
made a mistake: was it the model being attacked,
or the model used to enforce the constraint?
In other words, it is possible that the seman-
tic similarity model improperly classified xadv as
preserving the semantics of x. We refer to these
flaws in constraints as second-order adversarial
examples. Figure 1 shows a sample second-order
adversarial example. Second-order adversarial ex-
amples have been largely ignored in the literature
on NLP adversarial examples to date.
Now that we are aware of the existence of
second-order adversarial examples, we seek to min-
imize their impact. How can we measure a given
constraint’s susceptibility to second-order adversar-
ial examples? We suggest one such measurement
tool: the constraint robustness curve and its as-
sociated metric ACCS.
We then develop an adversarial example genera-
tion technique for finding examples that fool these
semantic similarity models. Our findings indicate
that adversarial examples for these types of models
exist, but are less likely than adversarial examples
that fool other NLP models.
Along the way, we compare the Universal Sen-
tence Encoder (USE) (Cer et al., 2018), a sentence
encoder commonly used as a constraint for NLP ad-
versarial examples, with BERTScore (Zhang et al.,
2019), a metric that outperforms sentence encoders
for evaluating text generation systems.
The main contributions of this work can be sum-
marized as follows:
1. We formally define second-order adversar-
ial examples, a previously unaddressed is-
sue with the problem statement for semantics-
preserving adversarial example generation in
NLP.
2. We propose Adjusted Constraint C-Statistic
(ACCS), the normalized area under the con-
straint robustness curve, as a measurement of
the efficacy of a given model as a constraint
on adversarial examples.
3. We run NLP adversarial attacks not on models
fine-tuned for downstream tasks, but on se-
mantic similarity models used to regulate the
adversarial attack process. We show that they
are [robust—not robust]. Across the board,
USE achieves a much higher ACCS, indicat-
ing that USE is a more robust choice than
BERTScore for constraining NLP adversarial
perturbations.
2 Second-order adversarial examples
To create natural language adversarial examples
that preserve semantics, past work has imple-
mented the constraint using a model that measures
semantic similarity (Garg and Ramakrishnan, 2020;
Alzantot et al., 2018; Li et al., 2018; Jin et al., 2019).
For semantic similarity model S, original input x,
and adversarial perturbation xadv, constraint C can
be defined as defined as:
C(x, xadv) := S(x, xadv) ≥  (1)
where  is a threshold that determines semantic
similarity. If their semantic distance is higher than
some threshold, the perturbation is considered a
valid adversarial example.
Using such a constraint in an untargeted attack
on classification model F , the attack goal G func-
tion can be written as:
G(x, xadv) := (F (x) 6= F (xadv)) ∧ C(x, xadv)
:= (F (x) 6= F (xadv)) ∧ (S(x, xadv ≥ )
(2)
Here, xadv is a valid adversarial example when
both criteria of the goal are fulfilled: F produces
a different class output for xadv than for x, and
C(x, xadv) is true. This type of joint goal function
is common in NLP adversarial attacks (Zhang et al.,
2020a).
It is possible that these constraints evaluate the
semantic similarity of the original and perturbed
text incorrectly. If the semantic similarity score is
too low, then xadv will be rejected by the algorithm;
if the score is too high, then the algorithm will
consider xadv a valid adversarial example.
If S(x, xadv) is too high, xadv is incorrectly con-
sidered a valid adversarial example: a flaw in model
F . However, since semantics is not preserved from
x to xadv, there is no reason to assume that F (x)
should be consistent with F (xadv). The flaw is
actually in S, the semantic similarity model that er-
roneously considered xadv to be a valid adversarial
example.
For adversarial attacks on model F using a con-
straint determined by model S, we suggest the fol-
lowing terminology:
• First-order adversarial examples are pertur-
bations that are correctly classified as imper-
ceptible by S, and fool F .
• Second-order adversarial examples fool S,
the model used as a constraint. Regardless of
the output of F , these are adversarial exam-
ples for S.
In the next section, we suggest a method for
determining the vulnerability of S to second-order
adversarial examples.
3 Constraint robustness curves and
ACCS
In this section, we propose the constraint robust-
ness curve, a method for analyzing the robustness,
or susceptibility to second-order adversarial exam-
ples, of a given constraint.
Each semantic similarity model may produce
scores on a different scale, varying the best  for
preservation of semantics. As such, we cannot
fairly compare two models at the same values of .
However, the problem of comparing two binary
classifiers that may have different threshold scales
is common in machine learning (Hajian-Tilaki,
2013). Inspired by the receiver operating char-
acteristic (ROC) curve for binary classifiers, we
propose the constraint robustness curve, a plot
of first-order vs. second-order adversarial exam-
ples as constraint sensitivity varies. To create the
constraint robustness curve for semantic similarity
model S and threshold , we plot the number of true
positives (first-order adversarial examples, found
using S as a constraint) vs. false positives (second-
order adversarial examples, found by attacking S
directly).
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Constraint Robustness Curve (Example)
Worthless constraint (ACCS = 0.090)
Excellent constraint (ACCS = 0.908)
Good constraint (ACCS = .500)
Figure 2: An example constraint robustness curve.
ACCS is defined as the normalized area under the con-
straint robustness curve.
The constraint robustness curve can be inter-
preted similarly to an ROC curve. An effective con-
straint will allow many true positives (first-order
adversarial examples) before many false positives
(second-order adversarial examples). The model
that produces a curve with a higher AUC (area un-
der the constraint robustness curve) is better at dis-
tinguishing valid from invalid adversarial examples,
and less susceptible to second-order adversarial ex-
amples.
When  = 0, C(x, xadv) is always true. But
even when the constraint accepts all possible xadv,
some attacks may still fail. So unlike a typical ROC
curve, which is bounded between 0 and 1 on both
axes, the constraint robustness curve is bounded
on each axis between 0 and the maximum attack
success rate (when  = 0). We suggest normalizing
to bound the score between 0 and 1.
We call the resulting metric Adjusted Con-
straint C-Statistic (ACCS) 1. ACCS is defined as
the area under the constraint robustness curve nor-
malized by the maximum first- and second-order
success rate. Figure 2 shows an example of a con-
straint robustness curve for a toy problem. (The
area under the green dashed curve is 0.105; after
normalizing by the maximum first- and second-
order attack success rates of 0.7 and 0.3, we find
ACCS = 0.5.)
There is one crucial difference between interpret-
ing an ROC curve and a constraint robustness curve.
A naive binary classifier will guess randomly and
achieve as many false positives as true positives,
1C-statistic is another name for AUC.
and an AUC of 0.5. A naive constraint will yield
all second-order adversarial examples at the same
threshold, and garner an ACCS of 0.0.
To create such a curve, we must devise methods
for generating both first-order and second-order
adversarial examples. In the following section, we
propose an attack for each purpose.
4 Generating first and second-order
adversarial examples
To calculate ACCS(S, ) for each S and , we
design two attacks: one to calculate the number
of first-order adversarial examples, and one to cal-
culate the number of second-order adversarial ex-
amples. In Section 5, we run the attacks across a
variety of models and datasets and examine their
constraint robustness curves.
4.1 Generating first-order adversarial
examples
To measure the number of first-order adversarial
examples allotted by a semantic similarity model
for a given value of , we can run any standard
adversarial attack that uses the semantic similarity
model as a constraint.
We devise a simple attack to generate adversarial
examples for some classifier F . We choose untar-
geted classification, the goal of changing the clas-
sifier’s output to any but the ground-truth output
class, as the goal function. To generate perturba-
tions, we swap words in x with their synonyms
from WordNet (Miller, 1995).
Simply swapping words with synonyms from a
thesaurus would frequently create ungrammatical
perturbations (even though they may be semanti-
cally similar to the originals). To better preserve
grammaticality, we enforce an additional constraint,
requiring that the log-probability of any replaced
word not decrease by more than some fixed amount,
as according to the GPT-2 language model (Rad-
ford et al., 2019). (This is similar the language
model perplexity constraints used in the NLP at-
tacks of Alzantot et al. (2018) and (Kuleshov et al.,
2018).)
As an additional constraint, the attack filters po-
tential perturbations using the semantic similarity
model to ensure that S(x, xadv) ≥ .
Finally, we choose greedy with word importance
ranking as our search method (Gao et al., 2018).
We can use these four components (goal function,
transformation, constraints, and search method) to
construct an adversarial attack to generate adversar-
ial examples for any NLP classifier (Morris et al.,
2020b).
4.2 Generating second-order adversarial
examples
Generating adversarial examples for classification
model F is a well-studied problem. But how do
we generate perturbations that fool S, a semantic
similarity model?
We first note what these adversarial examples
might look like. Our goal is to find ‘false positives’
where a semantic similarity model incorrectly indi-
cates that semantics is preserved. Specifically, we
want to find some (x, xadv) where S(x, xadv) ≥ ,
even though we know xadv does not preserve the
semantics of x.
To generate such perturbations, we design a
transformation with the goal of changing the mean-
ing of an x as much as possible (instead of preserv-
ing its meaning). At each step of the adversarial
attack, instead of replacing words with their syn-
onyms, we replace words with their antonyms, also
sourced from WordNet (Miller, 1995).
Next, we need to establish a goal function that
perturbations must meet to be considered adversar-
ial examples for a given semantic similarity metric.
We establish the following goal function:
G(x, xadv) := (S(x, xadv) ≥ ) ∧
((
∑
i
x[i] 6= xadv[i]) ≥ γ) (3)
Here, x[i] represents the ith word in sequence x,
and γ represents the minimum number of words
that must be changed for the attack to succeed.
With our goal function, perturbation xadv is a
valid adversarial example if it differs by at least γ
words from x, but its semantic similarity to x is
still higher than . If γ words are substituted with
antonyms, as γ increases, we can say with high
certainty that semantics is not preserved. In this
case, the semantic similarity model should produce
a value smaller than .
As in 4.1, we apply a second constraint, using
GPT-2 to ensure antonyms substituted are likely in
their context. For the search method, we use beam
search, as it does a better job finding adversarial
examples when the set of valid perturbations is
sparse (Ebrahimi et al., 2017).
A sample output of this attack (where γ = 2) is
shown in Figure 1.
5 Experiments
5.1 Attack Prototypes
We implemented our adversarial attacks using the
TextAttack adversarial attack framework (Morris
et al., 2020b). Figure 4 shows the attack prototypes
of each attack, as constructed in TextAttack.
As noted in the previous section, each attack
used the GPT-2 language model to preserve gram-
maticality during word replacements; we disal-
lowed word replacements that decreased in log-
probability from the original word 2.0 or more.
The other constraints in the attack prototype disal-
low multiple modifications of the same word, stop-
word substitutions, and, in the case of entailment
datasets, edits to the premise. 2
5.2 Semantic similarity models
We tested two semantic similarity models as S:
• The Universal Sentence Encoder (USE) (Cer
et al., 2018), a model trained to encode sen-
tences into fixed-length vectors. Semantic
similarity between x and xadv is measured as
the cosine similarity of their encodings. This
is consistent with NLP attack literature (Li
et al., 2018; Jin et al., 2019; Garg and Ramakr-
ishnan, 2020).
• BERTScore (Zhang et al., 2019), an auto-
matic evaluation metric for text generation.
BERTScore computes a similarity score for
each token in the candidate sentence with each
token in the reference sentence using the con-
textual embedding of each token. According
to human studies, BERTScore correlates bet-
ter than other metrics (including sentence en-
codings) for evaluating machine translations.
It also outperforms sentence encodings on
PAWS (Yang et al., 2019), an adversarial para-
phrase dataset where inputs have a similar
format to NLP adversarial examples.
5.3 Victim Classifiers
To create constraint robustness curves, we ran each
attack (first and second-order) while varying  from
0.75 to 1.0 in increments of 0.01. For the SST-2
dataset, which has some very short examples, we
varied  from 0.5 to 1.0 in increments of 0.02. For
2It is standard for NLP attacks on entailment models to
only edit the hypothesis (Alzantot et al., 2018; Zhao et al.,
2017; Jin et al., 2019)).
First-Order Attack
Attack(
  (search_method): GreedyWordSwapWIR(
    (wir_method):  unk
  )
  (goal_function):  UntargetedClassification
  (transformation):  WordSwapWordNet
  (constraints): 
    (0): GPT2(
        (max_log_prob_decrease):  2.0
        (compare_against_original):  True
      )
    (1): [Constraint](
        (threshold):  [ε]
        (compare_against_original):  True
      )
    (2): RepeatModification
    (3): StopwordModification
    (4): InputColumnModification(
        (matching_column_labels):  
['premise', 'hypothesis']
        (columns_to_ignore):  {'premise'}
      )
  (is_black_box):  True
)
Second-Order Attack
Attack(
  (search_method): BeamSearch(
    (beam_width):  2
  )
  (goal_function): FoolConstraintGoalFunction(
(constraint): [Constraint]
(min_acceptable_score): [ε]
(num_words_to_swap): [𝛄]
  )
  (transformation):  WordSwapWordNetAntonym
  (constraints): 
    (0): GPT2(
        (max_log_prob_diff):  2.0
        (compare_against_original):  True
      )
    (1): RepeatModification
    (2): StopwordModification
    (3): InputColumnModification(
        (matching_column_labels):  
['premise', 'hypothesis']
        (columns_to_ignore):  {'premise'}
      )
  (is_black_box):  True
)
Figure 3: Attack prototypes generated for attacks run
in TextAttack. The top shows the first-order attack,
run against a classification model using the semantic
similarity model as a constraint. The bottom shows
the second-order attack, run directly against a seman-
tic similarity model. During experiments, [Constraint]
is either USE or BERTScore, [] is varied from 0.5 to 1
or 0.75 to 1, and [γ] is set to 3.
the second-order attack, we fixed γ = 3. For our
tests, we chose the following three datasets:
• The Stanford Natural Language Inference
(SNLI) Corpus, which contains labeled sen-
tence pairs for textual entailment (Bowman
et al., 2015);
• The Stanford Sentiment Treebank v2 (SST-2)
Corpus (Socher et al., 2013), a phrase-level
sentiment classification dataset;
• Rotten Tomatoes dataset 3, a sentence-level
sentiment classification dataset (Pang and Lee,
2005).
For the first-order attack, we chose three target
models fine-tuned on each dataset (total of nine
models): BERT (Devlin et al., 2018), ALBERT
(Lan et al., 2019), and DistilBERT (Sanh et al.,
2019). All models used were pre-trained mod-
els provided by TextAttack (Morris et al., 2020b).
More details about experimental setup are provided
in A.1.
5.4 Results
We sampled 100 examples from each test set of
dataset for each attack. We repeated each attack
twice, once using BERTScore and once using the
Universal Sentence Encoder. In total, we ran 300
attacks.
Table 1 shows results for each model and dataset.
Figure 5 shows the constraint robustness curve for
each scenario.
Surprisingly, the Universal Sentence Encoder
achieved a higher ACCS than BERTScore across
all nine scenarios. This appears contradictory to
the claims of Zhang et al. (2019) that “BERTScore
is more robust to challenging examples when com-
pared to existing metrics”.
Additionally, at any given point, first-order ad-
versarial examples are found over twice as often
as second-order adversarial examples. This in-
dicates that most adversarial examples found in
NLP attacks may be first-order. This corroborates
human studies from (Reevaluating-Morris2020-
mb), which showed that humans rate adversar-
ial examples from the attacks of (Alzantot2018-ti)
and (TextFooler-Jin2019-re) to preserve semantics
around 65% of the time.
3The Rotten Tomatoes dataset is sometimes called Movie
Review, or MR, dataset.
First-order adversarial example
still it may please those who love movies 
that blare with pop songs , young science 
fiction fans will stomp away in horror . 
Model Prediction: Positive (100%)
USE Cosine Similarity: 0.96
Original
however it may please those who love 
movies that blare with pop songs , young 
science fiction fans will stomp away in 
disgust . 
Model Prediction: Negative (100%)
Second-order adversarial example
however it may displease those who hate 
movies that blare with pop songs , old 
science fiction fans will stomp away in 
disgust .
Model Prediction: Negative (97%)
USE Cosine Similarity: 0.92
Figure 4: First-order and second-order adversarial ex-
amples generated by our attacks on BERT-base fine-
tuned on the SST-2 dataset.
Constraint Under Attack
Dataset Target Model BERTScore USE
SNLI
BERT 0.590 0.730
ALBERT 0.569 0.678
DistilBERT 0.575 0.721
SST-2
BERT 0.290 0.423
ALBERT 0.407 0.464
DistilBERT 0.405 0.511
Rotten Tomatoes (MR)
BERT 0.382 0.383
ALBERT 0.388 0.427
DistilBERT 0.448 0.466
Table 1: Results of first-order and second-order attacks
on BERTScore and the Universal Sentence Encoder
(USE). Values are ACCS, a measure of constraint ro-
bustness. A higher ACCS score indicates a better con-
straint. Across models and datasets, USE achieves a
higher ACCS than BERTScore.
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Figure 5: Constraint robustness curves across attacks. The Universal Sentence Encoder finds more adversarial
examples in each model while yielding fewer adversarial examples via second-order attacks. ACCS results are
detailed in Table 1.
6 Discussion
Sentence length, S, and . As input x grows in
length, the a single word swap will have an in-
creasingly smaller impact on S(x, xadv). Some
NLP attacks that use sentence encoders as a con-
straint have combatted this problem by measuring
the sentence encodings within a fixed-length win-
dow of words around each substitution. For ex-
ample, Jin et al. (2019) considers a window of 15
words around each substitution. We chose instead
to encode the entire input, as both the Universal
Sentence Encoder and BERTScore were trained
using full inputs.
Applications beyond NLP. Table 2 lists exam-
ples of validity metrics across domains. To the
best of our knowledge, no domains outside of NLP
have suggested to use a deep learning model as a
constraint (Chakraborty et al., 2018). If adversar-
ial attacks in other domains do decide to use deep
learning models to measure imperceptibility, they
can follow our method to compare imperceptibility
models and evaluate their robustness.
The Catch-22 of second-order adversarial ex-
amples. Any adversarial generation method for
that employs an auxiliary model as a constraint
may generate second-order adversarial examples.
Although NLP is the only domain to use a model
as a constraint thus far, this problem is likely to
appear in other domains in the future. This makes
the problem of second-order adversarial detection
more important.
Towards better constraints on NLP adversarial
examples. Neither USE nor BERTScore scored
especially high ACCS scores on any of the stud-
ied tasks. We leave it to future work to explore
more choices of semantic similarity model and find
one that is more suitable as a constraint on NLP
adversarial examples.
7 Related Work
We can categorize adversarial attacks in NLP based
on their chosen definition of imperceptibility: gen-
erally adversarial attacks in NLP aim either for
visual imperceptibility or in semantic impercepti-
bility.
Visual imperceptibility. These adversarial ex-
ample generation techniques focus on character-
level modifications that a fast-reading human may
not notice. HotFlip (Ebrahimi et al., 2017) uses the
gradient of a character-level classifier to guide the
attack, and can often change the classifier output
with a single flip. (HotFlip also studies word-level
replacements, but only briefly.) Other works (Be-
linkov and Bisk, 2017; Gao et al., 2018; Pruthi
et al., 2019; Jones et al., 2020) craft adversarial
examples by inducing ‘typos’ in the input sequence
x, for example, by swapping two characters with
one another, or shuffling the characters in an in-
put. In these cases, imperceptibility is generally
modeled using string edit distance, so second-order
adversarial examples do not exist.
Semantic imperceptibility. This work focuses
on this class of NLP adversarial examples, in which
xadv must preserve the semantics of x. Most
work generates these xadv by swapping iteratively
swapping words in x with synonyms, and filtering
by some model-based constraint (Kuleshov et al.,
2018; Ren et al., 2019; Jin et al., 2019; Garg and
Ramakrishnan, 2020). Some alternative algorithms
have been proposed: Zhao et al. (2017) encode x
into a latent representation using a generative adver-
sarial network, apply the perturbation to the latent
vector, and decode to obtain xadv. Ribeiro et al.
(2018) craft ‘adversarial rules’ (mappings from
x → xadv) by a combination of back-translation
and human evaluation. TextBugger (Li et al., 2018)
crafts adversarial examples using word-level sub-
stitutions, but uniquely chooses between character-
level perturbations (exploiting imperceptibility in
appearance) and word-level synonym swaps (ex-
ploiting imperceptibility in meaning).
Although there have been many adversarial at-
tacks proposed on NLP models (Zhang et al.,
2020a), surprisingly few constraints have been ex-
Adversarial Example Domain Constraint
Images (Goodfellow et al., 2014) maximum `inf norm
Audio (Carlini and Wagner, 2018) minimum distortion in Decibels (dB)
Graphs (Wu et al., 2019) maximum number of edges modified
Text (Zhang et al., 2020b) minimum USE cosine similarity
Table 2: Examples of constraints across adversarial ex-
ample domains. All metrics are calculated between the
original input and any potentially valid adversarial per-
turbation.
plored. Alzantot et al. (2018) was the first to pro-
pose the use of a language model as a constraint on
grammaticality. Kuleshov et al. (2018) uses both
a language model to enforce grammaticality and
skip-thought vectors (Kiros et al., 2015), a form
of sentence encoding, to enforce semantic preser-
vation. Several attacks have used the Universal
Sentence Encoder to enforce semantic preservation
(Li et al., 2018; Jin et al., 2019; Garg and Ramakr-
ishnan, 2020).
Morris et al. (2020a) categorized constraints on
NLP adversarial examples into four groups: seman-
tics, grammaticality, overlap, and non-suspicion.
They also explored the effect of varying constraint
threshold on the quality of generated adversarial
examples, as judged by human annotators. Xu et al.
(2020) examined the quality of generated adversar-
ial examples based on different thresholds of attack
success rate. However, neither study considered
adversarial examples that may have arisen from
constraints, or explored evaluation via running ad-
versarial attacks on the constraints directly.
8 Conclusion
Work in generating adversarial examples in NLP
has relied on outside models to evaluate impercep-
tibility. While useful, this inadvertently increases
the size of the attack space. We propose methods
for analyzing constraints’ susceptibility to second-
order adversarial examples, including the ACCS
and associated constraint robustness curve metric.
This requires us to design an attack specific to se-
mantic similarity models. We demonstrate these
methods with a comparison of two models used in
constraints, the Universal Sentence Encoder and
BERTScore. We would especially like to see fu-
ture research examine constraint robustness curves
across more constraints and different attack designs.
We hope that future researchers can use our method
when choosing constraints for NLP adversarial ex-
ample generation.
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A Appendices
A.1 Experimental Details
Setup All experiments were run using the Tex-
tAttack framework in Jupyter notebooks running
in Google Colab using Tesla K80 GPUs. 4.
Models The attacked models are pretrained mod-
els provided by TextAttack (Morris et al., 2020b).
BERTScore and the Universal Sentence Encoder
are also loaded through TextAttack. The pre-
trained models are available on the HuggingFace
model hub under the following names:
• SNLI Dataset
– textattack/bert-base-uncased-snli
– textattack/albert-base-v2-snli
– textattack/distilbert-base-cased-snli
• SST-2 Dataset
– textattack/bert-base-uncased-SST-2
– textattack/albert-base-v2-SST-2
– textattack/distilbert-base-cased-SST-2
• Rotten Tomatoes Dataset
– textattack/bert-base-uncased-rotten-
tomatoes
– textattack/albert-base-v2-rotten-
tomatoes
– textattack/distilbert-base-uncased-
rotten-tomatoes
A.2 Constraints tested on paraphrase
datasets
Before running adversarial attacks on USE and
BERTScore, we compared their effectiveness on
common paraphrase identification tasks.
USE and BERTScore each assign a semantic
similarity score to each (original text, perturbed
text) pair. A hard threshold determines whether a
given score indicates a valid adversarial example.
Above this threshold, the perturbed text is assumed
to have preserved the semantics of the original in-
put; below it, semantics is not preserved, and the
perturbation is invalid. Li et al. (2018) defines va-
lidity as a cosine similarity of 0.8 or higher, as
measured by USE. Jin et al. (2019) and Garg and
4Google Colab is a great resource, providing free, easy
access to high-powered GPUs, but its timeout constraints can
be frustrating and unpredictable. By the end of the project,
this author shelled out $9.99 for the high-octane Google Colab
Pro.
Ramakrishnan (2020) choose a lower USE thresh-
old of 0.5.
Current state-of-the-art attacks in NLP gener-
ate perturbations one word at a time: generally by
swapping out a word with neighbors in the embed-
ding space (Alzantot et al., 2018) or with synonyms
provided by a thesaurus (Ren et al., 2019). Con-
sequently, their adversarial perturbations share the
lexical structure of the original inputs, with some
words swapped out for synonyms. This implies
that BERTScore would be a better fit for ensur-
ing semantic preservation during these adversarial
attacks, and less susceptible to second-order adver-
sarial examples.
Our initial question was how USE and
BERTScore compare on common datasets for
paraphrase identification. When used as con-
straints on adversarial attacks, constraints that can
more correctly distinguish paraphrases from non-
paraphrases should be less vulnerable to second-
order adversarial examples.
In the following subsections, we compare USE
and BERTScore on two paraphrase datasets, QQP
and PAWS, and then on Adversarial SNLI, on a
custom dataset designed to resemble the format of
NLP adversarial examples on the SNLI entailment
dataset.
A.2.1 Performance on paraphrase
identification
We evaluate USE and BERTScore on two common
paraphrase datasets:
• The QQP (Quora Question Pairs) dataset,
which contains 400k real-world pairs of para-
phrases and non-paraphrases collected during
Quora question disambiguation.
• The PAWS (Paraphrase Adversaries from
Word Scrambling) dataset, which contains
100k paraphrases and non-paraphrases. These
examples originally come from the QQP para-
phrases; non-paraphrases have been adver-
sarially edited to change semantics while re-
taining high lexical overlap from the source.
(Yang et al., 2019)
We sampled 1000 examples from the QQP and
PAWS test sets. All datasets are loaded using the
nlp package from HuggingFace5. The TextAttack
5See https://github.com/huggingface/nlp.
Dataset USE BERTScore
QQP 0.827 0.764
PAWS 0.608 0.662
Adversarial SNLI 0.635 0.710
Table 3: AUC Scores for BERTScore and the Universal
Sentence Encoder on QQP, PAWS, and our Adversarial
SNLI dataset. BERTScore shows an advantage PAWS
and Adversarial SNLI, indicating that it is a more ro-
bust choice for constraining semantics during NLP ad-
versarial example generation.
library (Morris et al., 2020b) is used to load pre-
trained USE and BERTScore models and to run
augmentation and adversarial attack experiments.
Figure 6 shows the distributions of scores from
each model (USE, BERTScore) on each dataset
(QQP, PAWS). Both models exhibit some ability to
distinguish paraphrases and non-paraphrases on
QQP, but produce very similar scores for para-
phrases and non-paraphrases on PAWS (with the
non-paraphrases having slightly lower scores).
We then used these scores to plot ROC curves
for each dataset; these are shown in Figure 7.
This table shows AUC for each model and dataset.
Surprisingly, USE (AUC 0.827) slightly outper-
forms BERTScore (AUC 0.764) on QQP; however,
BERTScore (AUC 0.662) outperforms USE (AUC
0.608) on the PAWS dataset. This corroborates find-
ings from Zhang et al. (2019) that BERTScore is
superior to sentence encoding methods on datasets
with high lexical overlap.
A.2.2 Performance on Adversarial SNLI
BERTScore exhibited higher performance than
USE on PAWS, a dataset of adversarial crafted
paraphrases. However, USE outperformed on QQP,
a more traditional paraphrase task. To shed light
on which method might perform better in an NLP
attack setting, we generate a dataset that resembles
potential perturbations during an NLP attack.
We set out to compare the two constraints in a
scenario more similar to a typical NLP adversarial
attack. To do this, we crafted a dataset of pertur-
bations that might appear during the course of an
adversarial attack.
We crafted our dataset of adversarial perturba-
tions starting with examples from the SNLI dataset.
We chose SNLI because it is commonly used for
testing NLP adversarial attack systems (Zhang
et al., 2020b), and because second-order adversar-
ial examples are particularly dangerous in the case
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Figure 6: Distribution of scores assigned by
BERTScore and the Universal Sentence Encoder (USE)
on the QQP and PAWS datasets.
of entailment, where a slight change in meaning
can cause a shift in ground-truth output. However,
this process could be emulated to test out constraint
options before running an adversarial attack on any
NLP dataset.
We sampled 1,000 (premise, hypothesis) from
the SNLI dataset and discarded each premise. For
each hypothesis, we created ten adversarial exam-
ples: one by substituting synonyms, and one by
substituting antonyms, and by substituting each of
(10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%) of the original words.
This produced a dataset with 10,000 examples. We
sourced synonyms and antonyms from WordNet
(Miller, 1995).
BERTScore achieved a higher AUC on the two
adversarial datasets, PAWS and Adversarial SNLI.
This is a surprising result since BERTScore turned
out to be so much less effective than USE as a con-
straint on adversarial examples (see Section 5). We
hypothesize that BERTScore is better at measur-
ing semantic changes of 1-2 words, while USE is
superior as the perturbation size grows beyond 2
words.
We can also see how across datasets, BERTScore
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Figure 7: ROC Curves for BERTScore and the Univer-
sal Sentence Encoder (USE) on the QQP and PAWS
datasets. USE outperforms BERTScore on QQP, but
BERTScore is better at PAWS.
assigns scores that are generally lower; a threshold
of  = 0.8 on USE cosine similarity may corre-
spond to a lower threshold, for example,  = 0.5.
